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## The Modernity of Ethnic Identity and Conflict

FRED W. RIGGS

**ABSTRACT.** Widespread apprehension and fear of catastrophe pervade the world at the close of the twentieth century. The Cold War finale, paradoxically, has not brought an end to history or opened an era of universal peace and democratic capitalism. Instead, we see violent conflicts between weakened states and rebellious ethnonational communities. An explanation cannot be found in primordialist theories or current expediency—instead, we must look to historical forces rooted in modernity and the rise and fall of industrial empires. From their ashes a host of newer states and mobilizing ethnic nations have arisen, all hoping to experience the fruits of modernization: notably industrialization, democracy and nationalism.

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[Italicized words prefixed by an asterisk (\*) are explained in the Glossary at the end of this issue.]

The rise of modernity in the West during the past few centuries created forces and situations that have now reached a boiling point and are producing civil wars, genocide, refugees, and international interventions on a global scale (Smith, 1996). At the same time, ethnic diversity and cosmopolitanism flourish and increasingly cross-cultural relationships are pervasively harmonious. Ethnic identity has, therefore, simultaneously become a cause for conflict and a reason for celebration. To explain this apparent contradiction, we need to understand how modernity has affected and even transformed the age-old phenomenon of inter-ethnic contact and cultural change.

*The Negative Effects of Modernization.* No doubt there are historical parallels: multiculturalism (polyethnicity) arose thousands of years ago and persists today, but has been deeply reshaped by modernity, which has now given it novel and menacing features. Since modernizers usually claim that modernization will bring rationality and the rule of law, democracy and peace with justice for all, it is hard for them to acknowledge that modernization has, instead, transformed the dynamics of multiculturalism, making it not just an underlying fact of life but, instead, a focus of

inter-group tension in the rising malaise of ethnic nationalism and civil wars, genocide, and refugees. Ethnic conflicts have become a global concern and international interventions designed to cope with their causes and with their consequences are proliferating—good illustrative case studies can be found in Thompson and Ronen (1986) and an ever-increasing flow of monographs and media reports.

In order to understand why ethnic conflicts are modern, we need to understand the place of polyethnicity in pre-modern societies, and see how it has been transformed by modernity. Although multiculturalism (or “polyethnicity”) has existed since the dawn of cities and civilizations, the conflicts typical of pre-modern societies were not viewed as mainly ethnic. Rather, rivalry between rulers, tribes, pastoral and sedentary peoples, and popular uprisings against tyrannical rule were understood in non-ethnic terms. Although revolting slaves might be ethnically different from their masters, they did not proclaim any sovereign rights based on their ethnic identity: instead, they merely demanded more humane treatment. Comments about these forms of pre-modern conflict and the limited extent to which they involved inter-ethnic differences are contained in the articles by Friedman and Hall presented in this issue. It is striking that Hall’s recently published book, *The Rise and Demise of World-Systems*, lacks any index entry mentioning ethnicity or ethnonational conflicts. Pre-modern societies were typically multicultural and prone to violent conflicts—but these conflicts were rarely, if ever, attributed directly to ethnic differences.

That has now changed fundamentally. When we look into the fundamental transformations wrought by modernity in our contemporary world system, we see that ethnic identity and conflict has now become a major force. We need to understand why this is true, and also to learn how modern ethnic conflicts can be resolved or minimized. The mounting world crisis caused by modernity makes such knowledge increasingly important. Although ethnic conflict is part of that crisis, we can perhaps alleviate the crisis if we learn more about how to reduce the severity of the conflicts that cultural differences now generate.

This article supports these sweeping generalizations by considering first the vast changes brought about by contemporary modernity followed by a discussion of the distinctively modern forms of ethnicity, and how they affect the identity of ethnics and their interrelationships.

### **The Nature of Modernity**

Modernity is highly ambivalent and increasingly global. It combines benefits with disasters—both positive and negative consequences. We need to recognize that these contradictory results are inextricably linked with each other; it is often impossible to enjoy the former without suffering the latter; we cannot enjoy the advantages of driving an automobile without risking fatal accidents; we cannot take advantage of modern medicine without increasing the population and multiplying the number of dependent elderly persons.

Our vocabulary is so polarized that we cannot easily express both the good and the bad in a single term. We view “melodies” as beautiful and “maladies” as ugly—yet both apply with equal force to the consequences of modernity. I have proposed the use of “malody” as a blend that links these contradictory Janus-like aspects of a single process—anyone offended by the vulgarity of this neologism can substitute the phrase, “melody and malady,” provided they remember that these are not two different things but contradictory aspects of a single process (Riggs, forthcoming a,

b). We can scarcely enjoy the melodies of modernity without simultaneously experiencing their maladies.

The rise of modern imperialism as a world-encircling affliction can be seen as, perhaps, the most important negative consequence of modernity, and the collapse of these empires following the great wars of the twentieth century is widely celebrated as a positive effect. However, the continuing turmoil within both the successor states and the imperial heartlands must also be viewed as negative effects of modernity. Increasing hostility between ethnic nations and weak states is one of the most conspicuously negative consequences.

An early manifestation of modernity was the conspicuous misery of the urban poor, people attracted to expanding cities by the lure of industrial employment. The benefits of industrialization required the liberation of workers from serfdom (Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*). The social problems generated by this transformation led to reform movements, including those that brought a single party to power in the Soviet Union. Its multiethnic population led to a Stalinist solution in which ethnic nations were promised autonomy but experienced centralized party domination, leading to growing nationalist sentiments that exploded when the Union collapsed.

The Industrial Revolution and rise of modern empires both led to massive increases in migration, both by workers seeking land and better job opportunities and by refugees fleeing oppression. As a consequence the mixture of peoples and interethnic frictions mounted. Simultaneously, democratic norms and nationalist ideals heightened the sense of oppression and exploitation experienced by those whose expectations and hopes could not be realized.

In the successor states of both the socialist and capitalist empires generated by modernity, ethnic nationalism has emerged as a salient force. Refugees and migrants in growing numbers have accentuated the problems of ethnic diversity. These are not problems caused by traditionalism or resistance to modernization; rather, they are the direct consequences of modernity. In order to appreciate more clearly what we may understand as the basic forces of modernity, we need to identify its most conspicuous features, and notice some related factors that are often confused with modernity. The necessary and incidental aspects of modernity can be identified rather easily, I think, when we contemplate the phenomenon of the modern state.

The notion of a *\*modern state* may be defined as a polity characterized by industrialization and democratization combined with a sense of national identity. In this usage, modernity refers to a condition rather than a time, thus some contemporary states are not modern. No doubt the original meaning of *\*modern* was present-day or contemporary, by contrast with past times; and all modern states are, by definition, contemporary in the sense that they have evolved within the last few centuries—300 years, perhaps, but especially during the last 150 years. We need to distinguish clearly between the qualities of modernity and the past/present/future time-frame.

All pre-modern states were not modern, by definition, (see, however, Friedman's transhistorical usage in the Glossary under *modern*) but in today's world, many contemporary states are non-modern, notably to the degree that they resist the use of industrial products and methods, rely on supernatural or hierarchical sources of authority rather than popular sovereignty, and regard ethnic homogeneity as unimportant. Few countries at the end of the twentieth century meet these criteria: Bhutan may come closest. The criteria of modernity are, no doubt, idealizations

that are rarely, if ever, fully actualized. Modern states that are conspicuously multi-ethnic stress their ideological goals rather than national unity—the former Soviet Union and South Africa under apartheid are good examples. The goal of “Americanization” has been important in the United States but obstacles to its attainment have led increasingly to emphasis on such values as “freedom,” “equality,” and “justice” for all, regardless of ethnicity. Nevertheless, many Americans still think it is important for citizens to speak one language and share a common ethos, becoming, thereby, a unified nation.

If we recognize that each of these properties refers to an ideal type rather than to an empirical reality, we can see that there are no fully “modern” states. However, we may think of any state as modern to the degree that it is characterized by: *\*industrialization*: the appreciation and use of goods that have been mass-produced by means of inanimate power sources (notably coal, oil, and electricity); *\*democracy*: the acceptance, in principle, of political legitimacy based on the popular election of representatives and the accountability of public officials to representative institutions; *\*nationalism*: the ideal of popular sovereignty based on the will of a nation whose citizens share fundamental cultural features and identify themselves as members.

All three of these dimensions significantly affect ethnic identity and generate ethnic conflict when they are imperfectly actualized. Each of them has ancient roots, but they became linked in the modern format only in recent centuries. They evolved gradually; they certainly did not suddenly spring into existence. We might usefully distinguish between different degrees or stages of modernity. We could, for example, use *proto-modern* to refer to states at an early stage in the development of modernity, and *neo-modern* for the contemporary or late stages in their evolution.

All contemporary states have been deeply affected by modernity, though in varying degrees—the negative (malady) aspects often prevail over the positive (melody) effects. All of the industrialized democracies are neo-modern, but many of the new countries are what Robert Jackson has called “quasi-states” (Jackson, 1990), lacking essential properties of a modern state. A more descriptive term is *\*anarchian* (a blend of “anarchy” and “authoritarianism”), which points to weak authoritarian regimes that are unable to control or serve large areas within their formal boundaries where war lords, gangs, and ethnonational movements flourish (for more details see Riggs, 1996).

Such regimes are more modern than traditional, however. I call them *\*para-modern* in the sense that they manifest the negative side-effects of modernity: hungry for the products of industrialization but unable to manage complex productive processes; happy to receive the support global institutions offer to “democracies” yet unwilling to accept the self-limitations that make real democracy possible; eager to live in culturally homogeneous states yet reluctant to accept the transformations called for by the ideals of liberal state nationalism. These are the conditions that, I believe, have generated ethnic cleavages and produced a host of ethnonational revolts.

### *What Is Not Modern?*

Whatever existed before modernity came into existence was, obviously, pre-modern but that does not mean that basic elements of modernity did not exist before modernity arose. Each of the three strands entwined in the cable of modernity has ancient antecedents that gradually evolved in the Western world into a pattern that we can identify as modern. Although much of the rest of the world has embraced this

pattern and modernized, with greater or less success, large parts of the world remain non-modern (it is anachronistic to call any contemporary society "pre-modern"). However, they are surely *para-modern*—insofar as their efforts to embrace modernity selectively have failed to achieve its desired benefits although its worst consequences often prevail, including the proliferation of ethno-political revolts and bloody civil wars. In order to talk clearly about the properties associated with modernity we need to distinguish them clearly from phenomena associated with the terms *traditional* and *Western*.

\**Traditional* refers to an Epimethean orientation that values the past, and should be contrasted with a Promethean (futurist) point of view that stresses change and new possibilities (Sheldon, 1936: 78). \**Traditionalism* (or "neo-traditionalism") flourishes in many modern as well as non-modern societies; it relates to a point of view, not a country, regime, or type of society. Clearly traditionalism motivates more people in some countries than in others, and both future and past orientations are time-conscious—in many countries what Sheldon calls the "waster" point of view is dominant—this is the attitude of people who focus on their current experiences and interests without much regard for either the past or the future (Sheldon, 1936: 82).

One may argue that non-modern societies stress traditionalism whereas more people in modern societies are oriented toward innovation and change or what Giovanni Sartori refers to as "novitism," a preoccupation with promoting change for its own sake. An obvious sign of novitism is emphasis on the "new" and the "post-" as necessarily better than the old, a posture reflected in the current vogue of "post-modernism." Unfortunately, novitism scarcely leads to prometheanism, or a deep concern for the future and its problems. Precisely because of the speed with which changes occur in any modern society, we desperately need such a future orientation, yet prometheans are as likely to be tormented in modern as in non-modern societies, and epimetheans, still widely admired, energetically promote traditionalist religious causes. Broadly speaking, all the many attitudes and value systems associated with modernity may well be discussed under the heading of \**modernism* but, whatever we call them, we should maintain a distinction between the concrete socio-economic and political changes linked with *modernity* and the subjective values and attitudes we may call modernistic or, more generally, modernism, including many post- or neo-traditionalist causes.

My guess is that everywhere, at all times, most people focus on the present and how best to meet their urgent immediate needs—they may not be "wasters" (as Sheldon defines this term) but they are "sensate" in the sense used by Sorokin (1941). These orientations cut across the traditionalism/novitism spectrum; I suspect that the most widely prevalent attitudes are neither traditional nor novitistic but something in between.

Although traditionalism was widespread in all pre-modern societies, there is such a wide range of variation between the most advanced civilizations of the past and primitive food-gathering communities that it is more confusing than clarifying to lump them together as "traditional." More importantly, we should recognize that most of today's afflictions, especially those based on ethnic conflicts, result from para-modern, not traditional, causes.

### *What Is Western?*

Another type of oversimplification arises from the careless use of Western as a synonym for modern. As explained above, I use *modern* to refer to the structural

changes that link a modern state with industrialization, democratization, and national identity. By contrast, \**Western* is a geographic term used to contrast the cultural practices that evolved in one place (the "West") with those that evolved in other places, that is, the "Rest." To underline this distinction, consider that until the end of the seventeenth century, Westerners were not modern: the world depicted by Shakespeare, Chaucer, Cervantes, Dante, or Boccaccio was clearly Western but scarcely modern—unless we use this word in its transhistorical sense as proposed by Friedman (in this issue). Consider also that many non-Westerners in the world today are very modern—as in Japan, India, or Egypt—while simultaneously they often reject Western life-styles and cultural norms.

Actually, it is difficult to operationalize the notion of "Western," and I avoid the term. If the core notion is that of Western Europe and the lands now occupied primarily by persons of European origin, should it include or exclude the peoples of Latin America, of South Africa, of Israel? Historically, how far back does "Western" extend—to feudal Europe, to the Roman Empire, to Greece and Egypt? Originally "Europe" identified Greece north of the Gulf of Corinth, or, etymologically, it meant the "land of the setting sun," that is, the "West" as viewed from the Levant, that is, the "land of the rising sun." The meaning of Europe gradually expanded westward until it ultimately included the British Isles. We now use \**West* for an expanded notion of Europe that includes North America and Australia and New Zealand but not, scornfully, South America. The evolving sense of *Europe* as an expanding realm is described in Leclercq (1982: 8–10).

If characterizing what is Western is confusing, consider the definition of its logical contrary. Geographically, the opposite of west is east and, for a long time, Europeans thought of the East as the whole world east of the Mediterranean. Apart from the parochialism reflected in this usage, the globalization of the world system now makes this dichotomy absurd. After the collapse of the industrial empires, the West became the North and a new dichotomy with the South emerged. However, the globalization of the world that has succeeded the Cold War makes even this distinction anachronistic. We are now led to a new dichotomy between the West and the Rest. Although this involves a neat rhyming of monosyllables, can we assign any useful meaning to the Rest? As a we/they dichotomy, it is as parochial and less justifiable than the Chinese *jung/wai* distinction between the Center and the Outside (the civilized and the barbarian). It is inescapably ethnocentric.

The boundary between the West and Rest is, surely, a fuzzy zone of indeterminacy and each can be both non-modern and modern. Increasingly, in the global syncretism that modernity has created, we can assimilate everyone's heritage to our own, but cosmopolitanism is not modernity; rather, it is the ripe fruit of modernity. Actually, the information revolution that Majid Tehranian describes (in this issue) has not only accelerated the Westernization of the world, but also has encouraged a parallel process of the *Resternization* of the West. As a result of modernity, a kind of global cosmopolitanism is evolving in consort with the information revolution and the \**pancapitalism*, which Tehranian also describes.

### **The Roots of Modern Ethnicity**

As noted above, cross-cultural relations (polyethnicity) have existed since the dawn of civilization—only in the most primitive food-gathering societies can we imagine mono-cultural homogeneity as a normal phenomenon. Ethnic differences and interactions between groups sharing different cultural norms—based on language,

religion, customs, and ancestry—continue into the present age, often without serious change.

Following the rise of modernity, however, *\*ethnicity* became linked to the modern state in ways that make it a new phenomenon, taking the varied and overlapping forms of ethnic nationalism, civic ethnicity and *ethnic plurality*. Before looking more closely at these modern forms of ethnicity, however, let us consider how they are affected by the three entwined strands of modernity: industrialism, democracy, and nationalism. Each has ancient precedents but their contemporary significance evolved only during the past few centuries when they became linked.

No doubt each strand can be analyzed independently of the others, and our social science disciplines encourage us to do that: economists study industrialism; political scientists focus on democracy; sociologists and anthropologists on nationalism. The modern role of each, however, becomes apparent only when it is examined in context with the others. Each has a long history that can be traced to pre-modern developments, but modernity evolved when they interacted with each other to produce the modern state. To flesh out this generalization, let me just mention their ancient precursors and then talk about how they are linked by modernity, especially through the *modern state*.

*Entwined Strands.* The Industrial Revolution evolved out of the ancient capitalist practices of traders and craftsmen and their city-states after, and only after, they were able to secure reliable governmental support for mass-produced enterprises by means of political and legal safeguards, augmented by infrastructures and services that only an administrative state could provide. The empowerment of bourgeois forces which made this possible gave new meaning to “democracy,” an ideal that had flourished in some ancient city-states, and it gave ancient ethnocentric biases a new significance when linked with citizenship.

What makes any democracy modern is its capacity to control a complex hierarchy of public officials, or, a “bureaucracy.” Bureaucracies are ancient, and complex rules for managing great empires evolved several thousand years ago, but the functions they had to perform in any agrarian society where subsistence farming and animal culture prevailed were quite minimal. Classical democracies actually lacked bureaucracies because, as small-scale agrarian states, they were not needed and volunteers or slaves could perform the few public services that were necessary. By contrast, in modern large-scale industrial democracies, the state must assume responsibility for a host of administrative tasks that are required both to support industrialization and to mitigate its negative consequences.

What makes a democracy modern is, therefore, its capacity to manage a complex bureaucracy through representative institutions. Learning how to replace kings as managers of increasingly complex bureaucratic institutions became a requisite for industrialism to flourish simply because kings, as personal rulers, could no longer manage these expensive and complex institutions. Above all, perhaps, citizens had to be able and willing to pay the taxes required to finance public administration in an industrialized society. Their acceptance of these costs hinged on both their increased income and their sense that government officials were, indeed, “public servants,” responsive to their needs rather than their oppressors.

As for “nationalism,” in a basic sense it has been ubiquitous everywhere and at all times insofar as communities experienced a “we” versus “others” sense of identity. Civilizations like those of Rome and China, to say nothing of smaller-scale societies like those of the Hebrews, the Navaho, and the Kwakiutl, felt that



their communities and cultures were superior to all others. A major qualitative change occurred when this ancient and universal sense of in-group superiority was transmuted into a philosophical myth for legitimizing the authority of a democratic state. This myth enabled modern states to replace supernatural monarchic authority with a secularized notion of popular sovereignty. The capacity of industrialists to organize mass production and market their products hinged on the availability of reliable and complex administrative institutions that could never be managed effectively by traditional sovereigns relying on sacred sources of authority—their erratic and often arbitrary rule made industrialization impossible. Ultimately, the success of the Industrial Revolution hinged on widespread acceptance of the nation as a substitute for monarchy as the basic source of political legitimacy for an industrializing state. However, the only way to implement national sovereignty was through representative institutions, the basic structure of modern democracy, a design that would both assure public policies sensitive to bourgeois interests and enable public administration to be more or less responsible and effective.

Secularism has so profoundly shaped our opinions about the sources of sovereignty that we no longer empathize with the agonies faced by societies whose belief in the sacredness of monarchic authority had to be jettisoned in favor of the secular legal framework required to make industrial production possible. Representative institutions offered a method for implementing democratic governance, but they failed to answer the underlying question, "Why should ordinary people be the source of authority for the management of a state?" Moreover, if sovereignty belonged to the people, how could one determine which people and where, ought to have that authority? It surely required a great leap of faith for any bourgeoisie to entrust its fate to a popular majority whose hostility to propertied people could easily lead to confiscation and insecurity from below. Yet no bourgeoisie could gain popular support for a form of governance in which only property-owners would have the right to vote. The myth of a "nation" promised to gain widespread support while excluding those most feared by the middle class, and offering some likelihood that a "tyranny of the majority" would not ensue. This myth permitted non-members of a nation to be excluded from political rights, while enhancing the likelihood that property-owners could determine the criteria for membership.

Modernity combined these three ingredients into a new synthesis. Neither industrialism, nor nationalism, nor democracy can be equated with modernity, but after they are fused in a modern state we can identify them as the necessary strands of a weave called "modern." Put differently, modern industrialism is the form that industrialism takes in modern states; nationalism becomes modern only when it legitimizes the existence of a modern state, or the aspiration to create one; and modern democracy exists only in states where representative institutions are able to control an effective governmental bureaucracy equipped to handle the baffling problems of industrialization.

Many contemporary states are not modern insofar as they lack these three basic elements—or, rather, they may be classed as more or less modern, perhaps "para-modern," depending on the extent to which they embody them. This notion by no means implies any theory of "stages" or the inevitability or even desirability of becoming modern. Rather, it permits us to assess the benefits and costs of modernity in a multifaceted complex. Among these costs, the ones I shall focus on in the rest of this article concern the transformations of intercultural contacts and relations that have generated the modern forms and problems of ethnicity.

### The Main Forms of Modern Ethnicity

Among the assumptions that John Bowen (1996) attacks is the notion that "ethnic diversity brings with it political instability and the likelihood of violence." I fully agree with his claim that greater ethnic diversity is not necessarily associated with violence. However, Bowen's assertion presupposes an ahistorical context, as though "ethnic diversity" has always had the same structure, and it fails to distinguish between three significantly different forms of modern ethnicity.

*Pre-modern Ethnicity.* In non-modern contexts, ethnic diversity was ubiquitous and rarely became a focus for ethno-political movements, though it was often, no doubt, a background factor in conflicts centering on other issues. To explain why this was so, remember that in domains under sacred forms of legitimation, diverse classes, castes, and ethnic communities had their own recognized and widely accepted niches—what Friedman, elsewhere in this issue, refers to as *\*ethnic hierarchy*. If slaves revolted, it was because they were oppressed as slaves, not because of their ethnicity; if rulers fought each other, it was for power and land, not because they were culturally different. Indeed, sovereigns were often quite different culturally from their subjects. Under pre-modern hierarchic forms of governance, everyone but the sovereign was a subject and, although subjects differed among themselves in their sense of fealty, they did not expect to be treated as equals nor did they count on governments for survival. Rather, they counted on nature and supernatural forces, including those influenced by royal rituals, for their welfare and survival. Citizenship, if it existed, was a privilege rather than a right, and it scarcely provided the basis for legitimizing the exercise of sovereignty by a state.

*\*Modern Ethnicity.* By contrast, the core feature of modern ethnicity involves citizenship, of the state (existing or sought) with which one can identify as a national. Modern ethnicity differs from traditional forms of polyethnicity because of the obligations and privileges modern statehood has created. The substitution of popular for royal sovereignty made the link between nation and state a crucial factor in everyday life: as noted above, it was not possible to legitimize democracy by claiming that any set of humans who happened to live within an arbitrary set of boundaries had the right to govern themselves by majority rule and representative institutions. Rather, a kind of mythical, even "sacred," entity called the nation became the basis for legitimacy. Moreover, as industrialization advanced, citizens came to depend increasingly on services provided by the state and to demand that political leaders should be sensitive to their needs; public policy and secularism replaced the reliance on natural and supernatural forces that was typical of monarchic rule.

Although "equality" and "justice" became talisman slogans in all modern states, their implicit premise has been that these benefits belonged to members of their nation, not to others or aliens and outsiders. Passports symbolize this fact of modern life—states admit credentialed aliens as a reciprocal favor, but stateless persons without such credentials are viewed with suspicion and treated like criminals. Citizenship has, therefore, become significant for everyone, not just for privileged persons; it carries rights as well as duties, and without it, statelessness easily turns into homelessness. Although multiethnic states are commonplace, the prevalent mythology made membership in an ethnic nation the requisite for citizenship, a claim that marginalized non-nationals and supported their demands for separate

statehood. Ideally, all citizens belong to one nation, and non-members are expected to assimilate or leave (voluntarily or by coercion). Philosophically, the legitimacy of modern states and their right to make and enforce laws hinges on the existence of nations whose members possess a sovereign right to choose and empower their rulers. No doubt this belief is more of a rationalization than a reality, more of a myth than a fact. Nevertheless, how else can we legitimize the exercise of state powers after the sacred authority of kings has been lost? Rulers who seize power and rely on brute force to maintain their rule may be obeyed, but out of fear, not loyalty—with terror, not respect. Majority rule lacks face validity in any multinational society—why should permanent minorities accept the right of dominant nations to control their lives? Modern ethnicity rests on this foundation: members of every cultural community need to be identified with a nation in order to assure themselves the status and rights of citizenship. When they cannot accept or support the state under whose jurisdiction they happen to live, they become alienated and hunt for better options.

Industrialization also plays a fundamental part in this syndrome because it imposes ever greater demands on governance. Capitalism (as a motor for the development of modern industries) and the complex problems generated by mass production, advanced technology, and associated scientific discoveries pose ever more costly and complex burdens on government. This means that the bureaucracies and the apparatus of public administration must expand in parallel with industrialization, and the resulting costs (especially through taxation and ever growing burdensome regulations governing the conduct of individuals and corporations) increasingly test the patriotism and loyalty of citizens. Moreover, when governments fail to perform adequately in an industrialized society, everyone suffers and resentment mounts against government, including bureaucrats and elected politicians.

*Forms of Modern Ethnicity.* In this context, citizenship imposes great burdens and offers valuable rights; good government has become a necessity. By contrast, in pre-modern societies, the average subject of any ruler could survive, even enjoy life, without worrying much about who governed or how. Recognition of the vast changes wrought by modernity in the status and prospects of all citizens (or subjects) of a state enables us to understand the deep significance of three forms of modern ethnicity: *civic*, *national*, and *plural*.

*\*Civic ethnicity* primarily involves members of marginalized communities who wish to become integrated as citizens of the country where they live, but it also affects all nationals of a dominant community whose attitudes and relationships with members of marginalized communities seriously affect their behavior and, reciprocally, their own comfort and well-being. The term *\*ethnic diversity* has come, increasingly, to represent a normal condition and problematic for all the citizens and subjects in any modern state who see themselves as members (or potential members) of a nation.

*\*Ethnic nationalism*, by contrast, prevails among marginalized communities in modern states whose members reject citizenship and demand sovereignty. They normally have a territorial base or “homeland” which, in fact or fantasy, can anchor the state they wish to establish by liberation or secession. However, population mobility (intensified by industrialism) has led to a widespread mingling of peoples, not only in cities but also in rural areas, seriously hampering efforts to carve independent states out of the enclaves which ethnonational movements claim for themselves. I use *\*ethnic cleavage* to characterize the relationships between subjects and citizens (ethnic nationalists and patriots) in such situations.

\**Ethnic plurality* applies to situations in which citizenship is not available to the subjects of a modern state who also lack any historical or territorial basis for claiming sovereignty. Although this condition is widespread, especially in the successor states of the industrial empires, it has received little systematic attention. I use Furnivall's (1948) term, *plural society*, to characterize the contexts in which these tragic victims of modernity live. Since "pluralism" is widely used for other concepts (including ethnic diversity and interest group democracy) I avoid using this word—see the entries on *pluralism* in the Glossary. Instead, we may speak of "plurality" or "pluralness" to characterize societies in which this third form of modern ethnicity prevails.

The term *diversity* is often used broadly to refer to all three forms of modern ethnicity, but this usage obscures the radically important differences between them. In my own work, I use "diversity" to refer only to relations involving *civic ethnicity*, where all communities in a given state accept their status as citizens (or would-be citizens). In fact, most of the literature on "diversity" actually deals only with civic ethnicity so this usage is normally not confusing.

By contrast, when someone is thinking about all three ethnic categories, it would be appropriate to use *modern ethnicity* as the generic term. Under this heading, we can consider the extent to which nonviolent or amicable relations prevail among different ethnic communities as a variable to be explained, not presupposed by definition: however, the expected profile of interethnic relations can vary greatly depending on which of the three forms one is thinking about. Moreover, I avoid using *ethnic* to talk about cultural communities in pre-modern societies, but that's only for convenience, since multiculturalism has prevailed in all world systems and pre-modern states, in a broad sense they were always "multi-ethnic." However, since *ethnicity* exists, by definition, only in multicultural situations, the term strikes me as an oxymoron—there cannot be any mono-ethnic society, although of course isolated communities can be mono-cultural. To say that there was "ethnicity" in pre-modern societies necessarily implies they were multicultural. Let us now look more closely at each of the three forms of modern ethnicity.

*Civic Ethnicity.* The most widely studied form of modern ethnicity involves "ethnic diversity," as defined above. Sometimes, admittedly, racial and ethnic prejudices lead to pogroms, genocide, and urban riots directed against particular minorities. Such clashes do not involve nationalistic claims for sovereignty, however. Moreover, modern democracies are often able to overcome the prejudices and conflicts that generate these forms of violence. For a good background analysis, see Inglis (1996). Violence associated with ethnic diversity is, I believe, diminishing throughout the world, although tensions and misunderstandings associated with ethnic diversity will surely persist. A summary report on the status and problems of ethnic minorities in the industrialized democracies can be found in Rhodebeck (1992).

Actually, "diversity" often refers to intercultural relationships in which conflicts are minimal or non-existent. Scottish immigrants to the United States, for example, easily become well-integrated Americans yet cherish ancestral traditions that they joyously celebrate on special occasions—in some contexts these communities are viewed as *neo-ethnic*, possessing only the vestiges of ethnic identity. However, when we extend the notion of "ethnicity" to include dominant communities as well as marginalized ones, we can see that any forms of cultural difference between communities in a society may be classed as "ethnic," creating opportunities for the celebration of differences rather than displays of hostility. When we recognize

cultural differences among the citizens of a state and members of a “nation” as normal and wonderful, we can see ethnic diversity as an asset, not a liability.

Unfortunately, we have not yet progressed so far. Most members of less fully acculturated communities in the United States—like the Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Jewish-Americans, or Polish-Americans—are fully Americanized, but no sharp lines can be drawn between those who retain or cultivate their identifications with ancestral communities and others who view themselves primarily as “Americans” while retaining a secondary interest in their ethnic linkages.

Words like “eclecticism” or “cosmopolitanism” have been used to discuss harmonious ethnic diversity. Most of the literature on diversity, however, pays scant heed to eclecticism even when harmonious integration is seen as the ultimate goal. Reports on Hawaii by Michael Haas provide a good example of widespread ethnic harmony in diversity (Haas, 1996), but even in Hawaii many ethnic frictions remain and often attract more attention than pervasively harmonious relations. Nevertheless, interethnic harmony among citizens of a nation state is commonplace and we need to learn more about how to cultivate ethnic diversity based on nonviolent convivial relationships.

Some of these conditions are purely symbolic, such as the *\*ethnonyms* used to identify communities (do they have positive or negative connotations?) and whether or not it is acceptable to make ethnic jokes—making fun of Polish-Americans was widely accepted until a Polish cardinal became the Pope, after which it also became “politically incorrect” to poke fun at this community. Far more important than these symbolic matters, however, is the degree to which ethnics are able to achieve all the political, economic, professional, and cultural values that are attainable, in principle, by all Americans, or by citizens in any other country.

Understanding that a sense of national identity may be necessary as a basis for the legitimizing of democratic institutions, may we not also celebrate the reality that ethnic identity offers relief from the oppressive sense of sameness that cultural homogeneity can generate. In pre-modern societies, the average person was happily parochial—the family, village, and neighborhood, augmented by friendly ancestral spirits, provided a completely satisfying framework for personal and cultural identity. In the context of globalization, however, the kinds of cultural homogenization that cosmopolitanism and commercialization have generated in the modern world system, cause many individuals to feel swamped and anomic—they suffer from a loss of identity and crave traditional moorings.

In this context, possessing an ethnic identity becomes a solution, not a problem. One way to overcome the oppressive loss of identity generated by commercialism, urbanization, and media saturation is to emphasize ethnic connections, Americans who feel that they are “only American” look to their roots to learn how they can distinguish themselves from other Americans. An ethnonym can become not just a tag to mark one’s origins but, rather, a flag to celebrate one’s distinctiveness, an icon to ornament a T-shirt. Highly assimilated Americans, resisting the anomie of impersonality, may glorify their own ethnic identity, transforming neo-ethnic symbolic acts into more authentic and distinctive bases for ethnic diversity by joining clubs, studying one’s ancestral language and history, performing dances, eating special foods, and visiting one’s homeland. I shall not say more here about ethnic diversity (whether in its contentious or harmonious forms) because we need, I think, to focus more on the other modern forms of ethnic identity and conflict.

*\*Ethnic Cleavages.* The ruling minorities of the successor states of industrial empires (the Third and, now, the Second World) have become the targets of second-generation

self-determination movements, of revolts designed to partition multinational states and reunite divided nations, giving their citizens the advantages they feel deprived of in the states where they live. In fact, this mood has now become global. Governments in many First World states now also, increasingly, are hard pressed by movements among members of indigenous or national minorities within their own boundaries. The distinctive feature of these movements is the rejection by supporters of citizenship in the states where they live, and by their support for sovereignty movements that assert their right, as "nations," to govern themselves. Their concrete goals range from demands for independence or the reunification of divided nations to the acceptance of *\*autonomy* (a nation within a nation) as an acceptable goal.

Such protests and revolts reflect and foster ethnic cleavages. The violence created by these cleavages now generates torrents of refugees fleeing genocide ("ethnic cleansing"). Some of them settle as marginalized immigrants in a host land where they become part of the pattern of ethnic diversity. Looking back to their *\*homelands* however, they may also join externally driven movements to politicize and reinforce ethnic revolts in the countries from which they fled. Increasingly, members of ethnic diasporas are ambivalently torn between acceptance of citizenship in countries to which they have migrated and activism in the ethno-political movements of their original homelands. Since diasporas profoundly affect all three forms of modern ethnicity, I have decided to combine comments about them in a final section of this article. Before turning to this topic, however, let us consider more implications of ethnic cleavages as a deeply disturbing aspect of modern ethnicity.

The efforts of ethnic nationalists to create a *\*national state* in which all citizens share a common ethnicity often lead to the violent repression of minorities—when nationalism turns ugly, it can produce fascism and "ethnic cleansing" rather than efforts to assimilate or integrate "outsiders." Individuals previously content to be passive by-standers find themselves compelled to take sides when ruling elites declare that "anyone who is not with us must be against us." Civic ethnicity easily turns into ethnic nationalism whenever a regime seeks to impose national unity on its ethnic minorities. Although the two forms of modern ethnicity are quite different, individuals often shift from one form to another, or even maintain both orientations simultaneously but in different contexts (countries).

Examples are so familiar and numerous that it seems unnecessary to discuss them, but a few of them may be mentioned. Consider the Palestinian story: Under Ottoman and British rule, Arab and Jewish subjects coexisted with little violence but the creation of Israel and the flight of the Palestinians led to intense confrontations that generated Palestinian nationalism and the bitter struggle that still continues today in that embattled land despite its precarious "peace process." In Cyprus, violent clashes between Greeks and Turks are an essentially modern phenomenon, following that island's independence from British rule in 1960. No doubt intercommunal tensions have long existed on that island, but they were accelerated by the armed support and nationalistic rhetoric that came from Greece and Turkey, as well as from Cypriot activists on both sides. As the internal partition advanced, members of the Turkish minority concentrated on the northern reaches of the island and were able, by 1975, to establish a de facto (but still unrecognized) republic. Under the auspices of the United Nations and the European Union, efforts are now being made to heal the breach by some kind of federal arrangement that would permit Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live together in a unified country.

There is no need to say more about such processes: they are now the familiar stuff of innumerable press reports and television stories. They have led to the

creation of many self-determination movements among conquered or displaced peoples seeking justice and economic opportunity as defined by the modern norms of democracy and nationalism, reinforced by the increasingly urgent expectations and needs of industrialization. The failure of contemporary governments to satisfy these demands is especially galling to subjects when the rulers belong to an ethnic minority. The leaders of revolts and protest movements often heighten current grievances and attract more supporters by repeating and embellishing stories of past glories and oppression as a basis for their dreams of future progress and justice. Their aspirations for democracy, industrial development, and national independence attract followers and whet the ambitions of leaders who expect to gain power and glory if their movements succeed. Their ability to exploit such nationalistic slogans and grievances has escalated under modern conditions; they scarcely existed in pre-modern societies.

*How Violent?* Clearly ethnic cleavages are more likely to lead to violence than ethnic diversity. However, there are cases where nonviolent solutions have been found, thus there may well be strategies that can prevent or alleviate the violence so often provoked by ethnic cleavages. Is it possible that these examples provide lessons that can be applied in other cases?

The most conspicuous type of ethnic cleavage involves divided nations, peoples separated from each other by international boundaries. Exceptionally, a few have been reunited, Germany is the best-known example. However, this may be explained by the collapse of the East German regime, not by negotiation between the two principals. A few cases were negotiated as a precondition for independence: Cameroon and Togo, for example. More dangerous scenarios confront the divided Korean and Chinese peoples—a wary condition of “no peace, no war” prevails between them. Prospects for the reunification of the Kurds and Pushtuns appear bleak; each country in which their members live will strongly resist. The Somalis live in several adjoining countries but their internal cleavages make the prospects for unification bleak. The Basques and Azerbaijanis are divided by international borders but seem not to be much interested in unification.

The word “enclave” is normally used to refer to communities that seek unification with a motherland from which they have become separated geographically, but we may also use this term for “nations” seeking independence or autonomy. In some cases, especially where geographic boundaries can be clearly drawn, partition may be feasible, especially if the government is democratic and responsive to the concerns of its citizens. A leading example is that of former Czechoslovakia, but that case is exceptional and closer analysis suggests that matters of constitutional design and personal ambitions may have been more important than responsiveness to Slovak public opinion. However, Slovakia may be viewed as a model for enclave nations seeking independence.

International recognition and policies clearly play an important role. They helped the Baltic States establish their independence from the Soviet Union, but the internal crisis in Moscow was no doubt more important and it led, of course, to the establishment of many independent states in the former republics of the collapsed Union, with or without movements for partition. Similarly, the secession of Slovenia from Yugoslavia in 1991, followed by that of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, soon resulted in international recognition. The violence which followed arose from internal ethnic struggles (augmented by external support from Belgrade for the Serbian minorities).

In some cases, de facto partitions have occurred without international recognition of the separated nations such as the establishment of the Republic of Somaliland in 1991. The creation of the "Republic of China" on Taiwan resulted from internal political conflict and de facto independence since 1949 rather than ethnic differences—a weak separatist movement by natives of Taiwan appears to have little prospect for success and popular support has declined as more and more of the islanders are coopted into the Taipei regime. A Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared in 1983, as noted above. After a prolonged and bloody struggle, it remains unrecognized internationally although efforts to establish a viable federation continue.

The independence of Eritrea came in 1992, but only after a bloody civil war led to the collapse of the regime in Addis Ababa. Bangladesh gained its independence from Pakistan after a bloody war and, of course, the initial creation of Pakistan itself in 1947 involved the partition of India and was accompanied by great violence. The struggle in Abkhazia for independence from Georgia appears to have been settled by granting this region the status of an "autonomous republic," and the movement, since 1994, for Chechen independence from the Russian Federation has been especially bloody. Although a cease-fire agreement has been reached, the political status of Chechnya remains unclear. Resistance to the Myanmar (Burma) regime by Karens, Shans, and other ethnic communities appears to have been suppressed by 1995, while the complex insurgency in the south of Sudan continues without any prospects of resolution. There is no reason to believe that ethnonational movements for independence have run their course; more remain ahead as smaller and less developed communities become mobilized and dissatisfaction with existing governments and dominant minorities grows.

*\*Autonomy.* Administrative autonomy within the boundaries of an existing state promises a better solution for many problems of ethnic cleavage than secession or independence. The rulers of all existing states feel threatened by border changes that reduce their resources, power and prestige. This gives the rulers an incentive to cooperate so as to prevent the changes. Perhaps they will also recognize that it may be possible to accommodate enclave nations by granting them administrative autonomy, a solution that works best in the industrialized democracies of Europe and the New World.

Some examples of nonviolent solutions for ethnic cleavages illustrate these possibilities. In 1980, the Catalans and Basques were granted autonomy through the new Spanish parliamentary constitution under which 19 autonomous regions are now recognized. Although some Basques continue to fight for independence, Spain seems to have found a good accommodation with its Basque and other national minorities. The bitter ethnic cleavage in Belgium led, in 1993, to the establishment of self-governing regions for French-speaking Wallonia and Dutch-speaking Flanders, with Brussels as a bilingual enclave and capital serving also as a buffer zone. The most prolonged and bitter ethnic cleavage in Europe persists in Northern Ireland but, even there, earnest efforts are under way with support from all sides to arrive at a nonviolent resolution of this longstanding problem.

Tensions between the Maori people and the government of New Zealand continue, but also in a nonviolent way. Similarly, some "First Nation" communities in Canada enjoy treaty status and substantial autonomy; an agreement reached in 1992 created indigenous regions in the Northwest Territories and a plan for self-government by the Inuit people in a homeland to be self-governing in 1999. The



movement for Quebec's independence remains an active though nonviolent struggle, and a Party for an Independent Newfoundland has recently emerged. In the United States, many indigenous peoples have autonomy as self-governing nations though profound disagreements about their status and prospects persist. In Hawaii, a struggle for sovereignty on behalf of the Hawaiian people has escalated, but without violence.

Comprehensive information about ethno-political minorities now struggling for independence or autonomy can be found in the data compiled by Ted Gurr (1993a, b). Almost all of the sustained violence and civil wars based on ethnic nationalism are concentrated among these communities (where ethnic cleavages can be found). As noted above, the existence of such cleavages does not always generate violence; perhaps, overall, there are more nonviolent than violent cleavages.

Nevertheless, all *\*ethnic cleavages* can, potentially, lead to violence and civil wars. This form of modern ethnicity in which the subjects of a state reject citizenship and demand independence or autonomy creates political controversies that are far more intractable than those caused by ethnic diversity. However, when appropriate steps are taken to accommodate the needs and sense of injustice that prevail among ethnic nations, violence can be prevented and, perhaps, both economic development and generous public policies can lead their members, increasingly, to accept citizenship or autonomy within their host states as preferable to a continuing struggle for independence.

A third form of modern ethnicity involves communities whose members are denied the opportunity to become citizens yet lack any territorial basis for a movement demanding self-determination. Members of these communities are easily torn between contradictory alternatives: to support a class-based revolutionary movement, or to seek protection for their property and special interests by making concessions to the regime in power. The Chinese community in Malaysia offers a classic model of this dilemma. When the immigrants are numerous enough, they may gain power, as happened in Guyana, and when they are too weak, they may be expelled as were the Indians in Uganda. These situations of ethnic *pluralism* are clearly modern and have scarcely been adequately recognized in the literature, but we must postpone any discussion of their problems. They need to be examined but lack of space precludes such analysis here; for more comments see the entries on *pluralism* in the Glossary.

### **Diasporas**

All three forms of modern ethnicity are linked to *\*diaspora* communities, both as causes and consequences. Virtually every *\*ethnic nation* contains not only a core of people living in the territory they think of as their homeland, but also others who have migrated, sometimes as refugees but often as emigrants seeking better opportunities elsewhere. Members of such diasporas often choose to integrate in their hostlands, becoming citizens and even assimilated nationals. Diasporas reflect migrations, a topic discussed at some length in the article by Tehranian, in this issue. After migrants settle they create or join diasporas whose numbers have escalated as a result of modernity although, of course, they have existed in all world systems. Here I will say a bit about their presence and consequences for modern ethnicity.

Predictably, migrants do not forget their homelands and the relatives and friends they have left behind (their *\*anasporas*)—they often send financial remittances and

become active in political movements designed to make fundamental changes back home. Sometimes they support revolutionary or secessionist movements or, alternatively, they uphold established governments resisting such movements. The best-known diaspora is that of the Jewish people, and the creation of Israel in response to the tragic experiences of Jews in many countries is notable as a case in which a diaspora created a state. Both Jewish and Palestinian residents in foreign countries are, today, active supporters of the protagonists in Israel and Palestine. Much of the literature on refugees views them as subjects of compassion and humanitarian assistance and as victims of persecution or natural disasters. Here I want to focus on the socio-political role and activities of migrant communities as actors or subjects, not as the objects of attention by outsiders.

Under normal conditions, *diasporans*—the term I use for members of a diaspora—are grateful for the hospitality of their new neighbors in a hostland. However, when they are badly treated, especially when they experience nationalistic resistance to aliens as manifested in acts of ethnophobic violence, diasporans often respond by organizing support for ethnonationalist movements in their original homelands. Hopes for a return may inspire their activism. Indeed, migrants can become transmission belts: facing nationalistic exclusiveness and racism in their hostlands, they become ethnic nationalists in their homelands. Increasingly, mobility is accelerated by the new means of transportation produced by industrialization, and persecuted migrants (refugees) feel inspired to become active in movements that may make it possible for them to return home, a process that is far easier now than it ever was in pre-modern times.

Even members of a diaspora who integrate themselves into the daily life of their new hostlands may remain (or become) active in the nationalist movements of their homelands. No doubt diasporans are normally grateful for the hospitality they find in their hostlands, but in some circumstances, reciprocal interactions occur which link homeland and hostland problems. When, for example, the government of a hostland supports their homeland enemies, diasporans may well project their hostility to the new environment in which they have settled. They may also identify themselves with passionate movements embraced by fellow diasporans living in other countries. Those who are surviving precariously as refugees in a limbo-land are most vulnerable to such tensions and ethnonational movements. Sometimes diaspora activism can lead to a frenzy of genocidal attacks and terrorism, as we have seen most recently in Bosnia and Rwanda where diaspora movements have spearheaded interethnic encounters in their original homelands. "Ethnic cleansing" became genocide in the hands of Serb militants, and, as Bowen points out, the new Croatian regime "moved quickly to define Serbs as second-class citizens, fired Serbs from the police and military, and placed the red-and-white 'checkerboard' of the Nazi-era Ustashe flag in the new Croatian banner" (Bowen, 1996: 9). In the modern world, indeed, it is exceptional for ethnic cleavages to remain insulated within any one country; domestic turmoil is generated by a world system in which members of diaspora communities scattered around the world support and/or become activists in their original homelands.

Communities of migrants may also experience a diaspora in reverse: this happens when an original homeland reaches out to support or exploit their nationals abroad. They may be disappointed because such support fails to materialize, or they may be exploited by states who view their expatriates as pawns to be manipulated. Thus Indians in Fiji or Chinese in Indonesia who turn to India or China for help when they experience problems in their hostland may well be disappointed. However,

such regimes are eager to receive remittances from their overseas citizens and view them as a financial resource.

Possible ambiguities in the use of "diaspora" compel the addition of a terminological note. In its original sense, usually capitalized, Diaspora refers only to the Jewish diaspora. At the other extreme, "diaspora" is sometimes used to refer to any minority, such as, the Jews or the Hungarians in America. I avoid both of these meanings of "diaspora." Here I use it to refer only to communities whose members have left their homeland and are living elsewhere, usually in many different countries. The term does refer to an ethnic minority, but always in the context of its relations with an original homeland.

Members of a diaspora are involved in all three forms of modern ethnicity: diversity, cleavages, and plurality. The most visible, however, involves cleavages. Consider some examples. The Tibetan national movement is exceptional insofar as these refugees, despite great suffering, have accepted a nonviolent strategy and become effectively organized. Perhaps this is due to the nonviolent philosophy of their leader, the Dalai Lama, or the pacifist orientation of Tibetan Buddhism. More typically, diaspora peoples are divided into competing groups with clashing goals—Iranians outside Iran today provide a good example, starting with the movement led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, in exile, and continuing now with assorted opponents of the Islamic Republic. Armenians in diaspora are torn between supporters of the Armenian Republic and those who yearn to restore their country at Turkey's expense, as well as by religious cleavages. Virtually every country in which ethnonational conflicts prevail has diaspora communities which are actively involved in their struggles.

Diaspora communities, however, lack institutional structures to maintain coordinated action among their members. They typically produce rival factions whose internal conflicts hamper their impact. In this respect, their situation is typical for virtually all ethnic communities, whose members cannot reach a consensus about what they would like to do or achieve. Moreover, because diasporas are international or even global in scale, groups of emigrés in one country may or may not cooperate with fellow emigres in other countries—barriers of space and politics hamper trans-state coordination among members of global diaspora communities.

In order to talk clearly about these phenomena, we need to distinguish between each *\*ethnic nation* as a whole and its main components, that is, the members of its diaspora and those who remain at home. Unfortunately, diaspora lacks an antonym, but we could easily coin a neologism, such as *\*anaspora*, to refer to members of any ethnic nation who are not in diaspora—they are the people who remain at home. The stem for "diaspora" is *"speirein,"* meaning to scatter, and the prefix, *"dia,"* means apart. The suffix *an-* or *ana-* means "not" as in "anachronism," "analogy," "anonymous," or "anomaly." We may therefore think of those who have not scattered from home as being in anaspora. The use of this novel term would help us compare the position and attitudes of the home people (anaspora) and those who have left home (diaspora), contrasting those who have not dispersed with those who have.

In a few cases, communities in diaspora lack an anaspora. The Romany (gypsy) groups are perhaps the most familiar example and, exceptionally, they do not make ethnonational demands; rather, they normally ask only to be treated better in the many lands where they live and travel. The settled migrants produced by imperialism—creating ethnic *pluralness*—face a somewhat similar situation. Normally, when they are persecuted, they cannot or will not return to the "homeland" from

which they came, and they lack any new domain to claim as their own. They are, literally, in limbo and cannot identify with either a diaspora or an anaspora.

States experiencing internal conflicts typically seek to influence the members of their own diasporas. They may also use them as a pretext to justify interventions in foreign countries. The role of diasporas in international politics is stunningly important, I believe, yet it has received very little attention. Exceptionally, Stephen Ryan's book on ethnic conflicts in international relations points out that "States that have close affective links with ethnic groups in another state will often not remain indifferent to the fate of these groups" (Ryan, 1990: 35). Ryan, however, tells only half the story: he focuses on efforts by nation-states to support their own nationals in other countries, but we also need to consider efforts by diasporas to influence the foreign policies of the states in which they live. Moreover, ethnic nationalism often originates outside a home territory, among members of its diaspora who feel obligations and see opportunities that can result from their nationalistic activism.

The extent to which members of a diaspora involve themselves in the politics of their homelands is influenced, no doubt, by the attitude of their hostland neighbors who may help them integrate, or repel them by prejudice and discrimination. Diasporans who become citizens in their hostlands—or wish to become citizens—constitute an important element in the modern pattern of civic ethnicity (ethnic diversity). The more fully they become assimilated in these hostlands, the less likely they are to become activists in their original homelands. However, even well-adjusted and successful immigrants sometimes choose to become active in the politics of their homelands. Needless to say, ethnic plurality is also affected by diasporas, but their members may be exceptional in the degree to which they are indifferent to the problems of their original homelands and do not view them as objects of loyalty or contention.

We need, finally, to pay more attention to persons who integrate as citizens in the country to which they have emigrated while also remaining active in the ethnic politics of their homeland. This Janus-like pattern of dual (or multiple) ethnic identity is increasingly common, I think, and needs to be recognized as an aspect of modern ethnicity that will grow as the number of refugees and migrants stimulated by the evolution of our modern world system increases. This phenomenon overlaps cosmopolitanism, a product of the mobility of intellectuals, artists, businessmen, and international bureaucrats whose constant movement from country to country erodes their sense of belonging in any one place—they would much rather be "world citizens," by contrast with the ethnic nationals who profess a strong attachment to one locality. These processes have increased the pressure for dual citizenship, a practice that permits individuals to live and work, to invest and struggle, in more than one country. The old expectation that one should be a citizen of only one country (at a time) is losing force as members of diaspora communities and cosmopolitans become cross-pressured by polynational controversies and global interests. Paradoxically, however, they may also show signs of "glocalization," a type of ambivalence manifested by travelers who can easily switch their personal identity from that of a cosmopolitan to that of a parochial, and they may be either passive or active in either context. These new options seem to be widespread in all the forms of modern ethnicity.

The migration of peoples around the world is surely increasing as a continuing result of all three aspects of modernity: industrialization, democracy, and nationalism. This means that the number of ethnic minorities in almost every country of

the world will also increase, as will the size and activism of diasporas. In addition to all the domestic problems created by this process, students of ethnicity need to examine the role played by diaspora peoples in the rise and progress of modern ethnicity as a global phenomenon.

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